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The law of corporate reorganizations should focus on identifying the
residual owner, limiting agency problems in representing the residual
owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control over the
negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring.
—Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson (1988).1
For nearly two decades, scholars have sought to improve on the
existing method for governing large, public companies during bankruptcy
reorganization. In its essence, the existing method is to impose on the
incumbent managers fiduciary duties to all parties in interest and leave
those managers in otherwise unfettered control.2
Proposals for change have come principally from Law and Economics
scholars who seek to motivate managers through economic incentives
rather than legal duties.3 At the urging of Professors Baird and Jackson,

* Security Pacific Bank Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, lopucki@law.ucla.edu.
I thank Doug Baird, Frances Foster, Chris Frost, Bob Lawless, Ronald Mann, Bob Rasmussen,
Richard Scheelings, David Skeel, Bill Whitford and participants in the Washington University School
of Law’s F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium for comments on earlier drafts.
1. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 775 (1988).
2. Martin J. Bienenstock, Between Management and the Debtor In Possession’s Fiduciary
Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 567 (1992) (describing the existing method of governing the bankrupt
firm and noting that “a fiduciary’s role is to act in someone else’s best interest”).
3. E.g., Barry E. Adler, Finance’s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules,
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the focus has been on identifying the residual owners—persons whose
interests are identical with those of the firm as a whole—and putting those
persons in control of the firm. This sixteen year effort has been
unsuccessful because most firms have no single class of residual owners.
The Law and Economics scholars’ search is for persons who do not exist.
To illustrate the theoretical allure of the residual owner approach,
assume a firm with $100 million in assets that owes $30 million to secured
creditors and $200 million to unsecured creditors. If the bankruptcy
system followed the residual owner approach, it would put representatives
of the unsecured creditors in control of the reorganizing firm. The secured
creditors have no real interest in this reorganization because they will be
paid in full in any event. The shareholders have no real interest in this
reorganization because they will not be paid at all. The unsecured creditors
own the “residual”—that is, whatever is left after the secured creditors
have been paid in full. All of the gains and losses from actions taken
during the reorganization will fall to them. They are the residual owners
and so, according to the theory, the parties with the right incentives to
govern during reorganization.
This example assumed the firm’s value was known and the residual
owner’s identity obvious. Suspend either of those assumptions and the
residual owner theory of corporate governance collapses. If claimants at
two or more priority levels share residual owner status, their interests
conflict and the theorist must propose some device for sharing control
between them.
Most bankruptcy scholars who have considered the residual owner
approach have come away with a healthy skepticism.4 But despite its
theoretical difficulties, the residual owner approach persists. I attribute this
persistence to an empirical assumption that usually remains implicit. In
spite of the theoretical difficulties in identifying the single residual owners
of bankrupt firms, the scholars who employ residual owner approaches
believe that in reality, residual owners exist5 and can be easily identified in

67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (1994) (proposing to abolish reorganization proceedings so that
investors can give managers securities that align the interests of managers with those of the firm);
David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization
Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992) (proposing to put unsecured creditors in control on the theory they
are usually the residual owners).
4. See infra notes 10–18 and accompanying text.
5. For example, Skeel recognizes the difficulty in attempting to identify the residual class, but
nevertheless assumes throughout his discussion that a single such class exists. See Skeel, supra note 3,
at 480 (“The residual class is the first class that will be impaired if the plan proponent seeks to
compensate as many classes in full as the firm’s assets will allow.”).
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most cases.6 Parties may bluster about the uncertainty of firm value and
other parties may be compelled to compromise with them in order to avoid
an expensive, burdensome valuation process. But at bottom, those scholars
assume that the parties all know who is in the money, who is out of it, and
who—the residual owner—is in between.
This Article reports the results of an empirical study designed to test
that implicit assumption. The study concludes that no identifiable, single
residual owner class exists in most reorganizing large public companies.
Even by the end of the case, the parties have not been able to identify such
a class. Part I describes the theoretical debate over the existence and utility
of single residual owner classes in big bankruptcy cases. Part II presents
the empirical study, beginning with a description of the universe of cases
studied, the sources of the data, and the limitations of those sources.
Subpart A reports and discusses the study’s findings with respect to the
numbers of investors having different levels of priority in the reorganizing
firm. The typical reorganizing firm has about four investor priority levels
that are subordinate to secured and bankruptcy priority creditors. The
existence of so many investor priority levels makes it likely that investors
at more than one level will share residual owner status. Subpart B reports
and discusses the study’s findings with respect to the numbers of residual
owners actually identified by the reorganization process. The principal
finding is that in 62% of the firms studied, the reorganization plan
recognized that investors at more than one priority level shared residual
owner status in a manner that left them with a substantial conflict with
respect to investment policy. (That figure is a demonstrated minimum
level of sharing; the actual level may be much higher.) Part III concludes
that theories depending upon the existence of a single residual owner are
unworkable. The problem is not merely that single residual owners are
difficult to identify. The problem is that they rarely exist.
I. THE RESIDUAL OWNERSHIP DEBATE
The residual owner—typically defined as the investor who will reap the
marginal dollar of the firm’s gain or suffer the marginal dollar of its

6. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV.
673, 696 (2003) (“When we look at recent large, prenegotiated Chapter 11 cases, one commonly
observes that the senior bondholders are in fact the residual owners for all practical purposes.”); Skeel,
supra note 3, at 501 n.150 (“[B]ecause firms’ fortunes usually will not improve enough in chapter 11
to make full compensation of unsecured creditors a realistic possibility, unsecured creditors’
decisionmaking incentives should not be skewed in any significant way . . . In short, the skewing effect
seems likely to be more theoretical than real.”).
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losses7—is a frequently-invoked hero of economic theory. By that
definition, the residual owner’s incentives are precisely aligned with those
of the firm. Imbued with the traits of omniscient, rational self-maximizer,
the residual owner is in theory the perfect person to govern the firm.8 In
maximizing its own wealth, the residual owner will maximize the firm’s
wealth, and ultimately, social wealth.9
To implement this approach to corporate governance, however,
requires some means for identifying the residual owner and putting that
residual owner in control of the firm. The task has proven difficult, if not
impossible. In thinking the matter through, bankruptcy scholars quickly
recognized a problem with the definition of the residual owner. In the
world of economic theory, both money and decisions are infinitely
divisible, making it possible to talk about decisions that affect the
marginal dollar of gains or losses.10 In reality, decisions are lumpy. A
decision—to build a plant or cancel a product line—does not affect just
the marginal dollar of gains or losses. It affects an indivisible range of
marginal dollars. If, for example, a firm is close to insolvency, the
interests of both shareholders and creditors might be affected by the same
decision. If so, both groups would qualify as residual owners with respect
to the decision, and their interests would be in conflict. Shareholders
would prefer the high-risk, high-return choice because they would share
disproportionately in the gains. Creditors would prefer the low-risk, lowreturn choice, because they would suffer a disproportionate share of any

7. E.g., Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in
Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161, 190 n.159 (1990) (“The ‘residual’ claimants in any Chapter 11
case will be those whose claims are at the margin—that is, those claimants who stand to win or lose
depending on the fortunes of the firm.”); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in
Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1100 (1995) (referring to the “residual
claimants, who gain or lose at the margin from the actions of the firm”).
8. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 168 (1986). Jackson
states:
The only way that [a borrowing] decision can be made without bias is for it to be made by the
group that will reap the benefits of a successful decision and pay the costs of an unsuccessful
decision. That group consists of the residual claimants, who in the case of an insolvent
company are almost always the unsecured creditors. It is they that should determine whether a
loan is worthwhile and whether its terms are the best they can get.
Id.; see also Triatis & Daniels, supra note 7, at 1100 (“The neoclassical model of the firm proposes
that, given an imperfect world, the optimal solution is to vest decision making authority with the
residual claimants, who gain or lose at the margin from the actions of the firm.”).
9. E.g., Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9,
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 592 (1998) (“The logic is that any action
that helps the residual claimant will increase the value of all claims against the enterprise.”).
10. E.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 775 (“The dollar that is won or lost because of good
or bad negotiating by definition is felt by the residual owner.”).
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losses. Neither group’s interests would be congruent with those of the
firm, so neither group’s preference respecting the decision would be a
useful guide. No single residual owner would exist, and the residual
ownership approach to corporate governance would fail.11
Bankruptcy scholars were quick to recognize and acknowledge this and
a host of other problems with the residual ownership approach.12 For
example, they noted that the system could cede control to the residual
owner only if the system had some method for identifying the person or
group in that position. To identify the residual owner presumably would
require valuation of the firm.13 That valuation would have to occur at the
outset of the bankruptcy reorganization case.14 Yet, valuation is
notoriously expensive and difficult.15 Indeed, valuation is the essence of
the bankruptcy reorganization process. If the court could value the firm at
the outset of the proceeding, the proceeding would no longer be

11. In arguing that the residual owner is a myth with respect to firms in financial distress, I do
not mean to concede that they are any less a myth with respect to solvent firms. See Thomas A. Smith,
The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 214, 223–25 (1999) (arguing that sole residual owners do not exist in solvent firms).
12. E.g., Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (1991) (“Now the shareholders no longer have the right set of incentives because
they are the residual owners of the firm over only a limited range [of values].”); Christopher W. Frost,
The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 106 (1998) (noting the possibility that creditors and shareholders might both be
residual owners at the same time); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 771–
76 (1993) (refuting Baird and Jackson’s concept of “collapsed” residual ownership).
13. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 416
(1990) (“[H]ow does a judge identify the residual claimant when there are several layers of debt? To
do this the judge must know the firm’s value—yet the superiority of market over judicial processes in
pricing the firm’s assets is impetus for holding an auction. It is not particularly useful to have both a
judicial and a market valuation process for the same corporation.”); Thomas G. Kelch, Shareholder
Control Rights in Bankruptcy: Disassembling the Withering Mirage of Corporate Democracy, 52 MD.
L. REV. 264, 332 (1993) (“A difficulty . . . recognized by Professor Frost is that identifying the group
with the residual claims can be problematic. To make this determination with a reasonable degree of
certainty requires a valuation of the debtor’s assets.”); Scott F. Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency
Costs, and Voting Theory in Chapter 11, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 507, 544 (1998) (“The costs of
transferring voting rights to residual owners immediately upon bankruptcy would probably outweigh
the benefits, however. Identifying the residual owners at the early stages of a Chapter 11 case would
require valuation of all firm assets, and valuation is typically time-consuming, expensive and less than
reliable.”).
14. Skeel, supra note 3 at 500 (“The residual ownership class could be identified if the Code
were to provide for a valuation of the firm at or shortly after the filing of the chapter 11 petition.”).
15. Id. (“But such a valuation would be costly and would consume both physical and temporal
resources at a time when both typically are at a premium.”); George G. Triantis, A Theory of the
Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 915 (1993) (“[T]he
identification of the residual owner in a multi-layered hierarchical capital structure depends on a costly
and often ambiguous valuation of the firm.”).
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necessary.16 The court could simply distribute claims and interests in the
emerging firm on the basis of the absolute priority rule.17
Another problem was that the valuation necessary to identify the
residual owner would apparently have to be made by the bankruptcy
judge.18 That might in large part defeat the purpose of the residual owner
approach. The purpose was to shift control of the reorganization process
from the bankruptcy judge to a market actor.19 If the bankruptcy judges
chose the market actors, the bankruptcy judges were at least arguably still
in control.
Even if the theorist found some way to finesse the valuation problem at
the outset of the case, the firm’s value would continue to change during
the proceeding. The identity of the residual owner might change with it.20
To insure that control shifted to the investors at a different priority level
when they became the residual owners, the valuation process might have
to be continuous. Finally, scholars noted the practical difficulty of shifting

16. Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 112 (1992) (“If one could readily assess amounts of assets and
liabilities, the entire bankruptcy process would be extremely simple.”).
17. Frost, supra note 12, at 115:
The accurate use of this method requires an answer to the very question that bankruptcy
resolves—the value of the business assets. If the value of the business assets were readily
ascertainable, there would be no need for a judicially supervised reorganization process. New
claims to the assets could be generated automatically by an application of the absolute priority
rule. It is therefore the vagaries of business valuation that create the need for the
reorganization process.
Id.
18. But see Adler, supra note 3, at 1121 (proposing that investors contract to require that
managers hold “inalienable” interests that “would tend to align management’s interests with holders of
fixed obligations and would alleviate the need to have bankruptcy reorganization provide
management” with such stakes).
19. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751, 785 (2002) (“As a comparative matter, the senior lender who will not be paid in full will more
likely exercise control in a sensible fashion than will managers whose net worth depends on
continuation or a bankruptcy judge whose training is usually not in business operations.”); Norberg,
supra note 13, at 546 (“The residual owners have better incentives than the bankruptcy judge, who has
no financial stake in the firm, to make efficient deployment decisions.”); Skeel, supra note 3, at 501
(“The analysis clearly suggests that it is preferable that a majority of the firm’s unsecured creditors,
rather than a court, approve any preconfirmation sale of substantial assets.”).
20. E.g., Norberg, supra note 13, at 544 (“Further, unless and until extinguished, even the equity
interests in an insolvent firm have some value; there is always a chance that the firm’s fortunes will
take a turn for the better and yield value to the equity interests.”); Skeel, supra note 3, at 500
(“Moreover, as the fortunes of a bankrupt firm rise or fall during the course of a chapter 11 case, the
firm’s residual owner could change. It is thus far from clear when or how the decisionmaking class
should be chosen.”); Triantis, supra note 15, at 916 (“[E]ven if the court can determine the firm’s
value, that figure will fluctuate during bankruptcy, particularly in the lengthy reorganizations of
publicly held companies. Therefore, the loyalties of management under a residual owner rule may shift
several times among different classes of creditors as the value of the firm fluctuates.”).
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control from one group to another as the necessity arose. As Professor
George Triantis put it, “bankruptcy courts may find it difficult to mandate
shifts in the loyalties of management who are accustomed to serving
shareholder interests. Yet the alternative of replacing management loyal to
a prior class of residual owners may cause disruptions in operations and
loss of firm specific expertise.”21 As a basis for governing the reorganizing
firm, the residual owner approach appeared deeply flawed.22
Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson initially brought the
residual owner approach to bankruptcy governance. In 1988, they argued
that “the law of corporate reorganizations should focus on identifying the
residual owner, limiting agency problems in representing the residual
owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control over the
negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring.”23 Less than
a year later, Jackson expressed doubts about the approach.24 By the early
1990s, several writers had rejected it outright as unworkable.25
Others continued to adhere to the residual owner approach. Some
sought to rehabilitate the approach,26 some sought to apply it indirectly as
a means by which judges would assess situations,27 and some just

21. Triantis, supra note 15, at 916.
22. Professor Norberg raised an additional problem. Because a residual owner governance
scheme would often displace management upon the filing of the case, management would be reluctant
to bring firms into bankruptcy reorganization. Norberg, supra note 13, at 545 (“Finally, even if the
residual class could be identified without undue difficulty, a rule transferring voting authority to
residual claimants upon the filing of a petition, like a rule requiring appointment of a trustee, would
likely deter viable businesses from seeking Chapter 11 relief until it is too late.”).
23. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 775.
24. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 159 (1989). (“The problem of
transferring decisionmaking power from the equity owners . . . is compounded by the associated
problem that no other class may sufficiently reflect the interests of the claimants taken as a whole.
Thus, the objective of the collective is never entirely congruent with the objective of any of the
constituent parts.”).
25. E.g., Kelch, supra note 13, at 332 (“We can never be certain that we have chosen the right
group as the one with residual claims. To recognize this is to comprehend that we can never be assured
that corporate control is vested in the economically correct party.”); Triantis & Daniels, supra note 7,
at 1100 (“Even at the best of times, it is difficult to establish a governance process that aligns
managerial incentives with the collective interests of all stakeholders. No single investor or class of
investors can represent the collective interest of all stakeholders of an insolvent firm.”).
26. E.g., Norberg, supra note 13, at 545–50 (proposing residual owner voting on plan
confirmation); Skeel, supra note 3 (proposing to deem unsecured creditors as a group the residual
owners in every case).
27. E.g., Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: “Don’t
Look Back—Something May Be Gaining On You,” 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 248 n.494 (1994) (“A
court faced with a plan that favors one class of creditors, or the shareholders, might follow Case’s
guidelines as to when to use one approach or the other—that is, determine the identities of the residual
owners, evaluate the plan, and ask in this light whether the DIP is overreaching.”); Frost, supra note
12, at 114 (“When evaluating a particular decision, bankruptcy judges should attempt to discover the
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continued to invoke it without attempting to defend it.28 Like Freddy
Kruger,29 the residual owner approach was mortally wounded in article
after article, but would not die.
Scholars who continue to employ the concept of residual ownership in
bankruptcy governance proposals seem generally to acknowledge that the
concept cannot provide a neat solution.30 But they continue to believe that
residual ownership can work in some less precise or less direct manner,
and thus keep corporate decision making in the hands of market actors
and—perhaps more importantly—out of the hands of bankruptcy judges
and fiduciaries.31 Thus, Professors Baird and Jackson sought to solve the
problem of multiple residual owners by collapsing all future possibilities
to present value.32 That ascribed a single value to the firm and, they
argued, made it possible to identify a single residual owner in every case.33
Baird and Jackson undoubtedly recognized that the incentives of the
residual owner thus selected would not be identical to those of the firm,
but felt the incentives would be close enough. Professor David Skeel
proposed a similarly inelegant solution. He would have deemed the
unsecured creditors as a group—including senior and subordinated

views of the group that stands at the margin of solvency—the economic residual claimants.”); id. at
115 (“Thus, while residual claim analysis cannot provide a clear rule of decision, it can be used to
evaluate competing positions. Rather than simply ask whether a proposed business decision is correct,
this approach asks the judge to take account of the incentives of those advocating or contesting the
decision.”); Marshall E. Tracht, Insider Guaranties in Bankruptcy: A Framework for Analysis, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 497, 508 (2000) (“Thus, the directors’ fiduciary duties run to the creditors upon
insolvency because they become the residual claimants, the parties who stand to gain or lose based on
the decisions made by management.”).
28. E.g., Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed
Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1006 (1994) (“When a firm is clearly insolvent,
and the face value of outstanding debt far exceeds the present discounted value of the assets, creditors,
as the residual claimants, should have authority to decide how the firm’s assets are allocated.”).
29. For the historical record, Freddy Kruger is the resilient villain of the Nightmare on Elm Street
series of horror films. See The Nightmare on Elm Street Saga, at http://www.geocities.com/
Hollywood/Makeup/4303/nightmare.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
30. Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127,
138 (1986) (“One should not, however, exaggerate the difficulties inherent in deciding who among the
investors should conduct the sale.”); Frost, supra note 12, at 115 (“[The vagaries of business
valuation] present[s] an insurmountable obstacle to the full realization of such a theoretically neat
solution.”).
31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
32. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 761 (“The firm that is reorganizing is typically insolvent.
In the case that we focus on throughout this paper, if all future possibilities were collapsed to present
values, the senior creditor would be entitled to the entire firm. In this sense, the senior creditor is the
residual owner of the firm.”). But see LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 12, at 771–76 (refuting Baird
and Jackson’s concept of “collapsed” residual ownership).
33. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 762 n.58 (analogizing their solution to the shift of fiduciary
duties that occurs “upon insolvency”).
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creditors—to be the residual owners of every reorganizing corporation.
Despite their differing priorities among themselves, all classes of creditors
would have voted together on governance issues during reorganization.34
In an article published at the end of 2002, Professors Baird and
Rasmussen presented a new, and more elegant version of the residual
owner approach.35 They argued that no regulation of bankruptcy
governance is necessary because private contracting has already succeeded
in resolving investors’ conflicts of interest. They do not use the words
“residual owner” or “residual claimant,” but the concept is the same.
Contracts among the investors in the firm, they claim, vest control in “the
senior lender who will not be paid in full.”36 Those contracts shift the
control rights from one such lender to another as the fortunes of the firm
change.37
Much of the law of corporate reorganizations (and indeed corporate
law generally) is premised upon the idea that contracts set out
control rights of the assets in a way that is fixed and rigid. Under
this view, legal processes and rules are needed because exogenous
events create a mismatch between incentives of the individual
investors that possess control rights and what is in the best interests
of the firm as a whole. As Barry Adler has pointed out, however,
[contractual] control rights are typically defined dynamically. They
change as the firm’s fortunes change, typically in ways that ensure
that such mismatches do not occur.38
Thus, Baird and Rasmussen propose, the invisible hand of the market
solved the valuation problem the theorists could not. As a result, “the
senior lender who will not be paid in full will more likely exercise control
in a sensible fashion than will managers whose net worth depends on
continuation or a bankruptcy judge whose training is not in business
operations.”39 Freddy Kruger is back.

34. Skeel, supra note 3, at 501 (“Allowing every unsecured creditor to vote would mean that the
true residual class of unsecured creditors, as well as nonresidual classes of unsecured creditors, would
be free to participate in the vote. Notwithstanding its limitations, however, the benefits of a clear rule
outweigh the costs of attempting to determine precisely the firm’s residual owners.”).
35. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 19, at 753.
36. Id. at 785.
37. Id. at 778 (“Most large firms now allocate control rights among investors in a way that
ensures coherent decisionmaking throughout the firm’s lifecycle.”).
38. Id. at 781–82 (internal footnotes omitted).
39. Id. at 785.
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II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
The study includes all large, public companies emerging from
reorganization in United States Bankruptcy Courts as public companies
from January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1996. I identified these firms
from the Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD). Under BRD protocols,
firms are considered “public” if they filed an annual report with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for a year ending less than three
years prior to the bankruptcy filing and “large” if they reported assets in
excess of approximately $220 million.40 Ninety-eight firms met those
requirements.
I obtained the data regarding priority levels and plan distributions from
the plan summaries prepared by New Generation Research and published
on LEXIS as part of the Bankruptcy Data Source database (BDS). The
study relies upon the accuracy of those reports.
BDS often reported calculations of recoveries without specifying
whether the calculations were made by plan proponents or BDS plan
analysts. I accepted those calculations without further investigation. In
many instances, BDS either did not calculate recoveries or did not
calculate them in the form needed for cross-case comparisons. If the data
were sufficient to support the necessary calculations, I made them.41
The BDS plan summaries described the distributions by classes, not
priority levels. I converted classes to priority levels principally on the
basis of the names of the financial instruments involved. That is, the

40. The protocols appear in greater detail on my Bankruptcy Research Database website. See
Lynn M. LoPucki, WebBRD: Lynn M. LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Database, at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/
contents_of_the_webbrd.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
41. In making the calculations, I followed these protocols. I valued debt instruments at face
value. I valued stocks on the basis of projected rather than actual values, because projected values
better indicate whether the parties to the case believed they had identified a residual owner. Where
projections were not available, I used stock prices and numbers of shares outstanding from the Center
for Research in Securities Prices (“CRSP”). I used the first month of trading, except in a few cases in
which it appeared atypical based on subsequent months. In no case did I use a trading value from later
than the second month of trading.
For warrants, neither projections nor trading prices were available. In each case, where the value
of the warrants could conceivably have affected outcomes, I examined the relationship between the
warrants and the actual trading prices of the stocks over the warrant exercise periods. In only a handful
of cases did the stocks ever trade as high as the warrant price. For these cases, I placed no value on the
warrants, but indicted their existence with a “+” in the Appendices. In two cases, the warrants were
clearly in the money from the outset, but in neither did any reasonable value placed on the warrants
affect the classification of the case.
As a result of the reliance on the Bankruptcy Data Source (“BDS”) calculations and these
protocols, the valuations from this study are only approximations. The approximations are adequate,
nevertheless, because in very few cases did case classifications depend on subtle differences in
valuation.
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summaries described particular classes as composed of “senior notes,”
“12% senior subordinated debentures,” “all other unsecured claims,” or
“Class A preferred stock.” I developed a set of protocols for determining
priority level from those labels.42
The universe of cases studied includes only reorganizations. The 33
cases ending in liquidation during that period were excluded. Ten of the 33
cases produced no plan; the cases ended in conversion to Chapter 7. Plans
existed in most of the remaining 23 cases, but summaries were not readily
available. The bias this introduced is discussed in Part III.C.
A. The Numbers of Investor Priority Levels in Bankrupt Firms
1. Study Design
The residual owner theory depends on at least a rough congruence
between the incentives of the residual owner and the interest of the firm.
Theoretically, that congruence could exist not just for a single person as
residual owner, but also for a group of people whose interests were
essentially the same. Each member of such a group would have the same
incentives. They could be expected to act in the same manner, so it would
not matter which of them controlled the firm.
To illustrate, all shares of stock in a single class have the same rights.
Absent other influences, all owners of stock of that class would have the
same incentives with respect to the investment policies of the firm. If those
incentives were congruent with the interests of the firm, it might not
matter which of the shareholders were in control. Thus the single residual
owner necessary to make the theory work would not have to be a single
person. It could be a group of persons who each have the same interest.
In reality, such an alignment of interests within a class of investors
would be the exception. Investors differ in personal characteristics that
affect preferences, such as risk aversion or wealth, and many have
interests—other than the particular class of investment they hold—that

42. Even if they received materially different distributions, all unsecured creditor classes were
assumed to be general unsecureds unless words suggesting different priority were used. The following
words suggest differing priority: “subordinated,” “senior,” “junior,” “debenture,” and “bonds.” A class
labeled “subordinated” was assumed to have different priority from a class labeled “senior
subordinated.” A class labeled “senior unsecured” was assumed to have different priority from a class
labeled “unsecured,” but only if both were paid in full or the class of unsecureds received a materially
different distribution than the senior unsecureds. Priority levels holding less than $1 million in claims
were not considered separate, even if their distributions differed materially. Classes of preferred stock
were assumed to have identical priority unless they received substantially different distributions.
Classes of common stock were all coded as a single level of priority.
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would affect how they might govern. An unsecured creditor might also be
a supplier to the firm. A shareholder might also be an employee. A
bondholder might own stock. These differences constitute a substantial
hurdle for proponents of residual owner theories, but they are not the
subject of this study. This study proceeds on the assumption that all
investors at the same priority level have the same interests.43
Creditor and shareholder groups often agree among themselves that
some will have priority over others. Priority, as the concept is commonly
employed, means that if the funds available for payment are insufficient to
satisfy both obligations, the funds will be applied to the obligation having
priority until it is paid in full. Only the excess, if any, will be applied to the
subordinate obligation.
With respect to the firm’s investment policy, the interests of investors
with a given level of priority (hereafter referred to as an “investor priority
level”) differ from the interests of investors at other priority levels. High
priority level investors tend to prefer conservative policies; low priority
level investors tend to prefer risk taking.44 This part of the study sought to
determine the number of investor priority levels existing within each of the
firms, ignoring secured and bankruptcy priority claims.
An investor priority level should not be confused with a “class” of
creditors, as that concept is employed in bankruptcy reorganization.
Reorganization plans divide creditors and shareholders into classes.
Creditors and shareholders are placed in a class because all have at least
roughly similar rights under nonbankruptcy law. Members of a class
receive the same treatment under the plan, except as agreed by each
individual investor in the class.45 Investors at a single priority level may be
placed in several different classes, with the result that there are often many
more classes than priority levels. This study examines only the variation in
distribution between priority levels, not the variation in distribution among
classes from a single priority level.
To illustrate the difference, plans often classify the deficiency claims of
secured creditors separately from the claims of general unsecured creditors
and treat the two differently, even though both groups are of the same
priority level. Similarly, most of the plans studied classified unsecured

43. That they do not is reflected in varying recoveries to classes at the same priority level. The
variations are apparent in Appendices B and C, infra at 1373–74.
44. See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 12 at 672 (reporting that such conflicts actually
arose in the Continental Airlines and Manville bankruptcies).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2000) (“[A] plan shall . . . provide the same treatment for each claim
or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less
favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest.”).

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/4

p1341 LoPucki book pages.doc6/29/2005

2004]

THE MYTH OF THE RESIDUAL OWNER

1353

claims of less than a certain dollar amount in a separate “convenience”
class and treated them differently. Despite these classifications and
treatments, deficiency claims, general unsecured claims, and small
unsecured claims are all of the same priority level. For various reasons,
some of these claims received better treatment than others under the plans,
but all entered the proceedings with the same legal rights—those of
unsecured creditors.
Because distributions to convenience and deficiency classes are often a
function of factors other than priority level, those classes were excluded
from the study.46 If classes of general unsecured creditors were treated
differently without explanation, the distributions to each were included in
the data.47 If any substantial class at a priority level qualified as a residual
owner, the priority level was considered to be a residual owner. Plan
proponents estimated distributions to some classes as falling within a
range of percentages, rather than as a single percentage. In those cases, the
ranges were included in the data.48 Ultimately, the estimation by ranges of
percentages rather than single percentages made no difference in the
classification of any investor priority level for purposes of this study.49
Creditors can contract for priority in specific assets. These priorities are
nearly always in the form of security interests. Upon the filing of a
bankruptcy case, secured creditors are entitled to “adequate protection” of
their rights in the value of their collateral.50 With respect to the actuallysecured portions of their claims, secured creditors are not supposed to be
substantially at risk of the firm’s investment policy. Accordingly, they
should rarely be the firm’s residual owners. For this reason, and also
because data on secured creditors are virtually always inadequate for
cross-case comparisons, the secured level of priority is not included in this
study.
This study also ignores unsecured creditors entitled to priority under
the bankruptcy code. They too must be paid in full for the reorganization
to go forward over their objection.51 Rarely could they be the residual
owners of the reorganizing firm. First, their claims are usually small in

46. The convenience classes in the cases studied were sufficiently small in total amount that they
were inconsequential.
47. See Appendices B and C, infra at 1373–74 (listing multiple recoveries at some priority
levels).
48. Id.
49. In no case was a range broad enough to affect the classification of a case.
50. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (requiring, as a condition of confirmation, that the plan provide for
full payment to all bankruptcy priority claims).
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relation to those of the unsecured, non-priority classes. Second, in most
cases they are senior to unsecured classes that are being paid in full or
nearly in full.
Six types of priority levels remain: (1) common shareholders, (2)
preferred shareholders, (3) junior subordinated creditors, (4) senior
subordinated creditors, (5) unsecured creditors, and (6) senior creditors.
Creditors are “senior” if they have contracted to receive the pro rata
distribution owing to another, subordinated class. Thus, even though
senior creditors do not have priority over unsecured creditors, they may
receive full payment in a case where unsecured creditors do not.
Almost invariably, reorganizing large public companies are corporate
groups rather than single entities.52 A corporate group consists of a parent
corporation and one or more subsidiaries. Entities, not groups, file
bankruptcy cases. But once members of a group have filed, the bankruptcy
court consolidates the cases administratively. The effect of this
“administrative consolidation” is that the court administers the cases in
most respects as if they were a single case. The entities in the group are
likely to have a single management and be represented by a single set of
professionals. Thus they are likely to adopt a single investment policy.
Unless the court also consolidates the estates of the group members
substantively, creditors and shareholders continue to have claims against
the specific entities with which they originally dealt. If expected
recoveries differ across entities, so do creditor and shareholder incentives.
To illustrate, the unsecured creditors of entity A, which is expected to pay
95 cents on the dollar to unsecured creditors, would have little to gain
from risk-taking and much to lose. The unsecured creditors of Entity B,
which is expected to pay 5 cents on the dollar, would have much to gain
from risk taking and little to lose. Both these creditor groups are general
unsecured creditors. But because they are creditors of different entities in
the group, the two group’s interests are in conflict with each other and
with the interests of the corporate group as a whole. Neither creditor group
can be the sole residual claimant with respect to the relevant governance
unit, which is the corporate group as a whole.
Because each entity in a group has its own financial structure, each
potentially has its own residual owner or owners. Consider, for example,
an insolvent parent corporation that owns all of the stock of two
subsidiaries. Subsidiary A is solvent, Subsidiary B is not. Each of the three

52. The BRD records the numbers of entities comprising the corporate groups for 310
bankruptcy cases filed from 1980 to 2000. The number of “groups” composed of only a single entity is
6 (2%). See LoPucki, supra note 40.
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corporations has a single class of unsecured debt.
On these facts, the unsecured creditors of Subsidiary B are the residual
owners of Subsidiary B. The unsecured creditors of the parent corporation
are the residual owners of the parent corporation and Subsidiary A. That
is, any increase in the value of Subsidiary A will accrue to the benefit of
the parent corporation as the sole shareholder of Subsidiary A. That
increase in the value of the parent corporation will accrue to the unsecured
creditors of the parent corporation, as residual owners of the parent
corporation. The investors in this corporate group are at four levels of
priority: three levels of unsecured creditors and the shareholders of the
parent corporation.
Among the firms studied, the average number of entities in the
corporate group was 26 and the median number 17. Potentially, that
created a huge number of different investor priority levels. That huge
potential did not manifest in the reorganization plans. Only 14 of the 84
plans analyzed (17%) provided for distributions that differed by entity. In
most of the 14, only two entities were mentioned. The plan summaries did
not indicate whether the numbers were small because few entities in a
group incurred debt or because plan drafters consolidated the estates by
provisions of the plan.
The method employed in this study recognizes investor priority levels
resulting from the existence of multiple entities only if investors at those
levels received different distributions. To illustrate, if a plan provided for
distributions to unsecured creditors of the parent based on the financial
condition of the parent and to unsecured creditors of a subsidiary based on
the financial condition of the subsidiary, I recorded two unsecured creditor
priority levels. If, however, a plan provided the same distribution for
unsecured creditors of the parent and the subsidiary, I recorded one
unsecured creditor priority level, even if the plan classified the creditors
separately. Classes of intra-company claims and interests—that is, claims
or stock held by other members of the corporate group—were not counted
as investor priority levels.
The purpose of this part of the study was to determine the number of
investor priority levels existing in the financial structure of the
reorganizing firms. Each level represents an actual group of investors
whose interests could potentially have conflicted with investors at all other
levels. Whether that potential conflict became an actual conflict depended,
for each firm, on the range of possible firm values at the time of
bankruptcy and the contractual relationship among the investors at
different priority levels.
Of the 98 reorganizing firms in the targeted universe, the data were
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sufficient to support analysis of 84 (86%). The insufficiencies derived
from two sources. BDS did not summarize a few of the plans. In others,
the summary information was insufficient to show the investors’ priority
levels.
2. Findings
Appendix A shows the numbers of priority levels existing in each of
the 84 reorganizing firms for which data were available. Column (2)
shows that the numbers of investor priority levels ranged from a high of 13
to a low of two. Every firm had common shareholders (column (8)) and at
least one class of general unsecured creditors (column (4)). The large
majority of firms (79%) had at least one class of contractuallysubordinated debt designated as “senior subordinated” (column (5)). Most
also had either a class of junior subordinated debt (column (6)) or
preferred stock (column (7)). Only 18 (21%) had a class of unsecured
senior debt (column (3)). Firms that had a subordinated class of unsecured
creditors but not a senior class of unsecured creditors probably had a
senior class of secured creditors. Because the senior class was secured,
that class does not appear in the data.
Only 14 firms (17%) had separate priority levels resulting from the
recognition of separate entities.53 But nine of the 19 firms with six or more
priority levels (47%) had separate priority levels resulting from the
recognition of separate entities. If a firm incurs debt through multiple
subsidiaries, the number of investor priority levels can multiply rapidly.
The average number of priority levels was 4.3, the median 4. To the
extent that any structure can be described accurately as “typical” it would
be a firm with four or five priority levels subordinate to bankruptcy
priority creditors. That firm would have common shareholders, unsecured
creditors, senior subordinated debt, and either junior subordinated debt or
preferred stock. The typical firm would not have senior unsecured debt or
investor priority levels resulting from the recognition of separate entities.
The paradigm financial structure in the legal literature is a firm with
common stock, unsecured debt, and secured debt54—a combination that
would be characterized as having two investor priority levels for the
purpose of this study. Perhaps the most striking finding from this part of
the study is that only 7 of the 84 firms studied (8%) fit the paradigm.

53. These firms are indicated by an asterisk in Appendix C, column (8).
54. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 8, at 32. (“Under much modern corporate law it is most useful
to view shareholders, unsecured creditors, and secured creditors as the owners of the firm.”).
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3. Discussion
The findings with respect to the number of investor priority levels
show that theorists who seek to identify and empower the residual owner
are working on difficult terrain. Firms have multiple investor priority
levels in their financial structures. When the value of the firm is uncertain,
the likelihood that the range of possible values will stretch across priority
levels is great. When it does, no single residual owner can be identified
because none exists.
The cases analyzed in this study were drawn from an era in which junk
bond financing was common. Had the universe been drawn from a
different era, the numbers of priority levels may have been lower—or
higher.
That does not matter, however, to the problem at hand. Bankruptcy
theorists are not in the business of designing regimes that will work in
some eras but not in others. Changes in bankruptcy law and contracting
take years to work through the system. A solution inadequate to firms
emerging from 1991 to 1996 should not be adopted even if the current
crop of bankrupt firms have simpler financial structures.
B. The Residual Owners of Bankrupt Firms
The analysis reported in the preceding section addresses the potential
for investors at two or more priority levels to share the status of residual
owners. This section reports on the frequency with which that actually
occurred.
1. Study Design
The study design rests on two assumptions. The first is that when
investors at two or more priority levels each have recoveries that are
substantial but not substantially full, they share in the marginal dollar of
gains or losses. They are co-residual owners with conflicting interests. For
this purpose, a recovery is “substantial but not substantially full” if it
represents at least ten cents and not more than 90 cents on the dollar to
each of the two major classes involved. To put it another way, the study
design assumes that recoveries of up to about 10% can result from
nuisance value or errors in measurement, and so not indicate a substantial
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sharing in the marginal dollar of gains or losses. My earlier work with
Professor William Whitford supports the use of 10% as a cutoff.55
To illustrate this first assumption, if the plan proposes to pay 88 cents
on the dollar to a senior class of creditors and 12 cents on the dollar to a
junior class, I assumed that both classes were residual owners. That is, if
the firm had earned more than it did between the filing of the bankruptcy
case and the fixing of recoveries under the plan, both classes would have
shared in the additional earnings—for the same reasons they shared in the
actual earnings. If, instead, the plan had proposed to pay 88 cents to the
senior class and 2 cents to the junior class, I did not assume that the junior
class was a residual owner. The senior class might not have believed that
the junior class was entitled to anything at all, but nevertheless agreed to
payment of the nuisance value of its claim. Had the firm earned more than
it did, the nuisance value—which is a function of the amount of trouble
the junior class could have caused the senior class, not the amount the
junior class could have won for itself—might not have changed. If not, the
junior class would not have shared in the marginal dollar of gain (or loss)
and so should not be considered a residual owner.
Sharing in the marginal dollar of gains and losses is not always the
result of uncertainty regarding firm value or a deviation from absolute
priority. The pattern can flow from strict enforcement of rights under
subordination agreements when firm value is known.
To illustrate, assume a firm with 132 in assets, and three classes of
unsecured creditors, each owed 100. Absent agreement, each class would
be entitled to a recovery of 44, which is 44 cents on the dollar.56 But if the
Junior class entered into a typical subordination agreement, it contracted to
surrender its recovery to the Senior class until the Senior class has been
paid in full. In this example, the Junior class would surrender its entire
recovery—44—to the Senior class. The result would be a distribution of
88 to the Senior class, 44 to the General Unsecured class, and nothing to
the Junior class.
In this illustration, a precise firm value was assumed, and no deviation
from absolute priority has occurred. Nevertheless, the Senior and General

55. In a study of deviations from absolute priority in favor of equity in 43 cases filed in the early
and mid-1980s, we found on the basis of interview answers that the plan negotiators were confident of
insolvency in 30. The deviation from absolute priority in favor of equity exceeded 8.1% in only 2 of
the 30 cases (7%). Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 142–44
(1990) (showing the pattern of deviations and describing the interviews regarding the beliefs of the
negotiators). Equity recoveries were substantial in 11 of 12 cases of solvent debtors. Id. at 166.
56. 132/(100 + 100 + 100) = .44.
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Unsecured classes share in the marginal dollar of gains. If assets in the
above example increase by one, two-thirds of that one will go to the senior
class and the remaining one-third will go to the General Unsecured class.
Because both classes share in the marginal dollar of gains, both qualify as
residual owners. They have conflicting interests with respect to the firm’s
investment policy. With an expected recovery of 88 cents on the dollar, the
Senior class has relatively little to gain from risk taking. With an expected
recovery of only 44 cents on the dollar, the General Unsecured class has
much to gain from it.57
The second assumption of the study design is that firm value is
sufficiently volatile that an award of near full recovery to one priority level
combined with only a nominal recovery to the next lower level
demonstrates that creditors at neither level could be confident of their
recovery at earlier stages of the bankruptcy case. Each would have had an
interest in controlling the firm’s investment policy for their own benefit
during the case, so that both should be considered residual owners. For
this purpose, a “near full recovery” is one that exceeds 90 cents on the
dollar and a nominal recovery is one less than 10 cents on the dollar. This
second assumption identified only two of the 48 multiple-residual owner
cases (4%), making it of relatively minor importance.58
These assumptions may not be accurate with respect to borderline
cases. But direct examination of the data in the Appendices will show that
the results are robust. The findings are not driven by close cases.
2. Findings
Data were sufficient for analysis in 78 of the 98 target cases (80%). In
48 of the 78 cases (62%), investors from more than one priority level
qualified as residual owners under one of the two tests described in the
preceding section. Table 1 shows the number of reorganizing firms with
various numbers of residual owners.

57. The pattern of sharing in subordination cases is actually more complex than this example
would suggest. The legal effect of the subordination agreements in common use today is uncertain.
Both contests and compromises are common. E.g., In re Envirodyne Industries, Inc., 29 F.3d 301 (7th
Cir. 1994) (contest over the meaning of a commonly used subordination agreement); LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 55, at 160 n.76 (empirical study noting several challenges to subordination
agreements).
58. The cases were Gilbert/Robinson and WTD Industries.
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Table 1. Firms With Multiple Residual Owners,
By Number of Investor Priority Levels Involved
Number of investor priority
levels sharing residual
owner status
1
2
3
4
5
Over 5
Total

Number of firms

Percent of firms

30
28
11
5
2
2
78

38%
36%
14%
6%
3%
3%
100%

Appendix C provides more detail with respect to distributions by the 48
reorganizing firms having more than one residual owner.
Table 2 summarizes the data regarding firms with only a single residual
owner. The table shows that if a firm has only a single residual owner, that
owner is most likely to be the senior subordinated class. The next most
common single residual owners were unsecured creditors and common
stockholders.
Table 2. Residual Owners
Firms Having Only One Residual Owner
Priority level of
residual owners

Number of
firms

Percent of all
firms

Unsecured creditors
Senior subordinated
Junior subordinated
Preferred stock
Common stock
All firms with single
residual owner

9
10
1
1
9
30

12%
13%
1%
1%
12%
39%
(due to
rounding)

Percent of single
residual owner
firms
30%
33%
3%
3%
30%
99%
(due to
rounding)

Appendix B provides greater detail regarding the distributions by
reorganizing firms having only a single residual owner class.
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3. Discussion
In at least 62% of large public company reorganizations, no identifiable
single residual owner exists. Instead, two or more groups with conflicting
interests with respect to the firm’s investment policy share the marginal
dollar of gain or loss. The effect is to render unworkable virtually any
bankruptcy governance scheme that depends on identification of the
residual owner.
In two important respects, the methods employed in this study tend to
understate the difficulty in identifying single, residual owners. First, the
study determined the numbers of residual owners by examining the
distributions under confirmed plans. The terms of confirmed plans are
often fixed only late in the bankruptcy process, after the parties have had a
full opportunity to develop and test their analyses and understandings, and
usually after the negotiators have seen some reports of post filing
operations. By contrast, a comprehensive bankruptcy governance scheme
must go into effect at the beginning of the case. At that time, the task of
identifying residual owners might be considerably more difficult.
Second, the study’s methods provide a very conservative estimate of
the number of investor priority levels whose interests conflict with those
of the firm. By using outcome data to assess investor interests, the method
implicitly assumed that the outcome of each of these cases—
reorganization yielding a particular distribution—was inevitable. In fact,
the outcomes probably were not. Consider, for example, the ten firms
shown in Appendix B to have paid 100 cents on the dollar to all their
creditors. Because the creditors recovered the full amounts owing them,
the creditors are not classified as residual owners. But the creditors in each
of these ten bankruptcy cases were probably significantly at risk. Had
those risks resolved differently, they would have lost money. Were it not
for the possibilities those risks would have resolved differently, the firms
would not have needed to file bankruptcy.
The study’s methods treat these creditors as having had no conflict
with shareholders as to the firm’s investment policy, even though most
probably did. The same is true for other investor priority levels considered
non-residual in the cases listed in Appendix B. As a result, this study’s
finding of single residual owners in 38% of reorganizing firms probably
overestimates substantially.
The findings from this Part have implications for several proposed
schemes of bankruptcy governance. Professor Norberg, for example,
rested his proposal on the assumption that although a single class of
residual owners could not be identified at the beginning of reorganization
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cases, such a class could be identified by the end.59 The data indicate that
this is true for only a minority of cases.
Professors Baird and Jackson proposed to identify residual owners by
collapsing the possibilities as to future firm values to establish a single
value for the firm.60 The data from this study show that proposal, even if
implemented perfectly, would place control of the firm in the hands of a
group with interests significantly different from those of the firm as a
whole in more than 62% of cases.
Professor Skeel proposed that all unsecured creditors, regardless of
priority level, should vote on governance issues as a single class.61 The
data from this study suggest that, under Skeel’s proposal, the creditors
voting in 9 of the 78 cases (12%) may have had no residual owners among
them, because shareholders were the sole residual owners. The creditors
voting in an additional 56 cases (72%) would have substantial priority
conflicts among them.62
Finally, Baird and Rasmussen argued that contracting parties solve the
bankruptcy governance problem by dynamically allocating “control
rights”63 to a succession of “single investor[s]”64 so there is no “mismatch
between incentives of the individual investors that possess control rights
and what is in the best interests of the firm as a whole.”65 The data from
this study cast doubt on that possibility. No single investor group with
incentives matching those of the firm existed in the large majority of the
cases studied.
Baird and Rasmussen characterize banks and financial institutions,
acting in the capacity of prepetition secured lenders or debtor-inpossession lenders (“DIP lenders”), as the residual owners and controllers
of reorganizing firms.66 Secured and DIP lenders were not directly the

59. Norberg, supra note 13, at 543–50.
60. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 761 (“The first that is reorganizing is typically insolvent. In
the case that we focus on . . . , if all future possibilities were collapsed to present values, the senior
creditor would be entitled to the entire firm. In this sense, the senior creditor would be entitled to the
entire firm. In this sense, the senior creditor is the residual owner of the firm.”).
61. See supra note 32.
62. Appendices B and C, infra at 1373–74. This figure is derived by counting the cases in which
creditors at two or more priority levels recovered different percentages of their claims, including
priority levels that were paid in full or received no distribution.
63. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 782 (“[C]ontrol rights are typically defined
dynamically.”).
64. Id. at 785 (“To be sure, a firm might find itself caught up in a sudden crisis, and no single
investor may be able to take control. But these cases are increasingly rare.”).
65. Id. at 781.
66. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons From Enron,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1787, 1807 (2002) (“In the case of a large firm in bankruptcy, we find that, at the
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subject of this study. But in the large majority of the cases studied, secured
and/or DIP lenders had rights senior to the priority levels studied. The DIP
lenders had priority over unsecured creditors and so were protected by
substantial cushions of equity in nearly every case.67 The secured lenders
were entitled to adequate protection and so, with respect to the secured
portions of their claims, should not have been at risk at all. Thus, the
control exercised by DIP lenders is rarely control by a residual owner.68
Secured lenders sometimes had unsecured deficiency claims. But in
most of the cases studied, such deficiency claims would have been paid in
full.69 It is a reasonable assumption that secured bank lenders fared no
worse on their deficiency claims than the best recovery listed in Appendix
B or C for each case. Those best recoveries were substantial in the large
majority of cases. The data from this study suggest that the interests of
banks and financial institutions probably were not at substantial risk in the
cases studied.
The financial structures of reorganizing firms fluctuate over time. Less
of the firm’s value belongs to unsecured creditors in today’s
reorganizations than in the reorganizations studied.70 But the unsecured
creditors’ stake in today’s reorganization is hardly negligible.71 When they
deliver control rights to secured creditors or DIP lenders, the contracts
Baird and Rasmussen describe are delivering control rights not to sole
residual owners, but to institutionally powerful classes that may not even
be the firms’ principal risk bearers.72

moment Chapter 11 is filed, a revolving credit facility is already in place that entrusts decisionmaking
authority to a single entity. This entity will often step in and replace management. It will make the
necessary operational decisions before Chapter 11 begins.”).
Baird and Rasmussen portray these creditors as simply having control. Professor Stephen Lubben
provides a more nuanced theory that portrays them as sharing control with other participants in the
case. Stephen J. Lubben, Learning the Wrong Lessons: Baird and Rasmussen’s Third Lesson of Enron
and the Inherent Ambiguity of Control (2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
67. In over half of the cases, a class of unsecured creditors recovered 100 cents on the dollar. In
all cases, a class of unsecured creditors recovered more than 18 cents on the dollar. The debtor-inpossession lender would have priority over all these classes.
68. David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 936 (2003) (questioning whether DIP financers “have appropriate decision
making incentives during the Chapter 11 case”).
69. In 41 of the 78 cases (53%), unsecured creditors were paid in full.
70. A preliminary survey of reorganization plans from the period 2001–02 indicates that
unsecured creditors recover 10% or less in about 29% of cases, 11% to 49% in about 33% of cases,
50% to 99% in about 13% of cases, and 100% in about 25% of cases. The corresponding percentages
for the cases studied are zero, 27%, 15%, and 59%. See Appendices B and C infra at 1373–74. Lynn
M. LoPucki, Preliminary Survey (spreadsheet on file with author) (2003).
71. Id.
72. For example, the preliminary survey mentioned in the previous note discovered no case in
which a DIP lender recovered less than the full amount owing.
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The classes gaining control rights under those contracts are biased in
favor of liquidation. Perhaps the increase in the number of liquidations
since 1998 is to some degree attributable to that bias.73 The legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly and correctly rejected the idea
that protection of the public investors in stocks and bonds should be left
“to a plan negotiated by a debtor in distress and senior institutional
creditors who will have their own interests to look after.”74
Finally, some scholars who realize that no single, identifiable residual
owner exists nevertheless believe the residual owner concept can be useful
in identifying and excluding non-residual owner classes from
governance.75 Those scholars may take hope from the fact that many nonresidual owners can be identified in the data.76
Whitford and I argued that the bankruptcy system should identify those
who clearly and obviously are not residual owners and deny them estatefunded representation.77 That falls far short, however, of specifying a
useful mechanism by which the remaining investors could govern. No
means have yet been suggested to unite the interests of co-residual owners
and align them sufficiently with those of firm to provide effective
governance.78
III. A BRIEF RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RASMUSSEN
In his comment on this article, Professor Robert K. Rasmussen points
out that my data do not prove that the current system of bankruptcy
governance maximizes the value of bankrupt enterprises.79 In that, he is
correct. My methodology had a more modest goal. As Rasmussen aptly

73. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Bankruptcy Boom (unpublished manuscript 2003) (graph showing a
large increase in bankruptcy liquidation of large, public companies since 1998).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 95-598, at 10 (1977).
75. E.g., Frost, supra note 12, at 115.
76. Of course, the number who can be identified in this end-of-the-case data is probably
considerably larger than could be identified sufficiently early in the case to yield governance benefits.
77. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625
(1991) (arguing for “‘preemptive cram down’ orders extinguishing the interest of the shareholders of
clearly insolvent debtors”).
78. Skeel’s proposal that all co-residual owners vote as a single class, supra note 2–6, does not
work. To illustrate the problem, assume two investor priority levels, senior and junior. The senior
would tend to favor liquidation, the junior would tend to favor reorganization. If every investor voted
its self-interest, the outcome of the vote would depend not on the desirability of liquidation or
reorganization, but merely on which priority level had the larger amount of claims.
79. Robert K Rasmussen, The Search for Hercules: Residual Owners, Directors and Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1445, 1468 (2004) (“What he has failed to do, however,
is to demonstrate that those who make decisions today do so in a way that does not maximize the value
of the enterprise.”).
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put it, that goal was “to shake the faith of those who believe that the fate of
financially distressed firms is best determined by those with their money
on the line.”80 Those with their money on the line are the residual owners.
I assumed that proving it impossible to identify them and put them in
control would doom the idea of direct investor governance during
bankruptcy. The system of fiduciary control contemplated by the 1978
Bankruptcy Code would be the only viable alternative.
Professor Rasmussen has, however, come up with a third possibility.
The courts could honor contracts by which debtors have ceded “control” to
particular creditors. Rasmussen seems to acknowledge that the controllers
thus selected would be neither single residual owners, nor coalitions of
residual owners. The controllers’ interests might conflict with those of
other creditors and of the firm. But those conflicts, Rasmussen posits, may
not have any appreciable effect on investment policy. Stakeholders who
compete for control, he argues, do not “fight over how to increase the size
of the pie”81 they fight only over the sizes of their respective pieces. When
it comes to the selection of investment policies, the stakeholders’ common
interest maximizing the total value of the emerging firm so far outweighs
their conflicting interests in maximizing their individual shares that the
latter can safely be ignored. To maximize firm value, all that is needed is
that “those who have a voice in making [the] decision[s] have both the
skill and [some] incentive to make [them] correctly.”82
In context, Rasmussen’s claim is essentially that the other creditors can
trust the DIP lender to act in the interests of all when making the decision
to call the loan and liquidate the business. Professor Jay Lawrence
Westbrook recently argued convincingly to the contrary
“[N]eutrality is a necessary concept in any system for managing a
general default in which the policy maker provides for multiple
beneficiaries and charges the manager with maximizing value for all
of them. A dominant secured party cannot be a neutral manager, and
its management creates a serious potential of loss for other
beneficiaries. It is just that result that provided the impetus for a
major restructuring of the insolvency system in Britain.83

80. Id. at 1446.
81. Id. at 1448 (“What they do not do, however, is fight over how to increase the size of the
pie.”).
82. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673,
696 (2003).
83. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 852
(2004).
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In the absence of empirical evidence, I am inclined to agree with
Westbrook. (It is no small irony that the two of us, who have been
economic skeptics, should find ourselves arguing that economic
incentives matter, and that the leading law and economics
scholars—Baird and Rasmussen—should be on the other side,
insisting that conflicting economic incentives can safely be ignored.)
Rasmussen may be correct in his assertion that investors at
different priority levels seldom actually clash over the firm’s
investment policy. But that does not mean that, given the chance,
investors at different priority levels would make the same decisions.
Clashes over investment policy did occur in the 1980s. Creditors
routinely forced the resignations of managers and replaced them
with others who governed more to the creditors’ liking.84 In the
1990s, the bankruptcy courts began competing for the favor of
managers who could bring them big cases.85 As a result, creditors
are less able to force failed managers from office and so less able to
contest the direction that management (and in some cases the DIP
lender) set for the company.86 The failure of various creditor groups
to maintain corporate governments-in-exile that clash with managers
over investment policy does not mean, however, that given control,
those groups would make the same investments. They have different
incentives, and will pursue them up to the point where the courts
call a halt to it. Thus, I see no reason to believe that governance by
contractual designee will mean neutral governance. I look forward
to the coming debate over Baird and Rasmussen’s theory of “control
rights.”
I hope that the debate over the empowerment of the residual
owner is now at an end. From Rasmussen’s Comment, that is not
entirely clear. Early in that Comment, he identifies two uses of the
84. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 696, 723–37 (1993)
(empirical study finding high rates of CEO turnover); id. at 746–48 (empirical study concluding that
creditors dominated many debtor managements).
85. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 16–18 (2005) (explaining the corrupting power of the
competition).
86. Id. at 143–45 (explaining the inability of competing courts to force changes of management).
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residual owner concept. The first is as a “yardstick,”87 or “metric”88
by which to evaluate corporate governance. Rasmussen concludes
that the “sole owner” better serves that purpose,89 suggesting that we
will hear no more of residual owner as a yardstick.
The second use of the residual owner concept he describes as
“more direct. It would attempt by law to vest control rights directly
in the residual claimants. It is this use of the residual owner standard
that is LoPucki’s focus here.”90 Rasmussen never directly tells us
what he thinks of this second use. His failure to endorse it in these
circumstances, however, suggests that at long last Freddy is really,
finally, dead.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Many scholars are committed to the idea that market actors with their
own money at stake—residual owners—can better decide the fate of
reorganizing firms than bankruptcy judges. That commitment led to a
sixteen-year effort to discover a way of identifying and empowering the
single residual owner of the reorganizing firm. It is time to recognize that
the effort has failed. This study has shown that most reorganizing
companies have no single residual owner and suggests that companies
with single residual owners are rare. Neither courts nor contracts can put
the single residual owner in control of the reorganizing firm because the
single residual owner does not exist.
The effort to identify and empower residual owners is not merely futile,
it is dangerous. Some scholars have argued that secured and DIP lenders
are the residual owners of reorganizing firms and applauded those lenders’
efforts to take control.91 Those scholars have been influential. In many

87. Rasmussen, supra note 79, at 1453 (“The [residual owner] insight could be deployed two
ways. One is as a yardstick. We ascertain which groups or groups is in control of the process and then
compare their incentives to that of a residual owner . . . .”).
88. Id. at 1459 (“The residual owner concept . . . is a metric by which to assess the structure of
governance rights in corporations.”).
89. Rasmussen, supra note 79, at 1453 (“or, in an even better metric, that of a sole owner”).
Presumably, the “sole owner” is a better metric because it is simpler and easier to understand. By that
standard, the traditional legal standard, the “interests of the estate,” would be better yet.
90. Id.
91. E.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 19, at 785 (applauding the supposed shift in power
from bankruptcy judges to secured lenders); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 695 (arguing that
“[p]roviders of new cash . . . at first approximation, have exactly the right incentive”). In fact,
providers of new cash to bankrupt businesses ordinarily have incentives that cause them to favor
investment policies far more conservative than the policies that would maximize the value of the firm.
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cases, senior lenders who are not at risk have succeeded in gaining control.
As a result, the system may be liquidating firms that it should reorganize.
Pseudo-residual owners have interests that differ from those of the
firm. Even if the differences are small, they may be capable of deflecting
firm investment policy. In 1993, Whitford and I discovered that even
subtle shifts in investment policy—management’s pursuit of potentially
small gains in firm value—could result in much larger shifts of risk among
investors.92 Thus, small deviations of the controlling owner’s interests
from the firm’s interests can create huge conflicts among the parties in
interest. This study has shown that in a system that attempted to identify
and empower the residual owner, such conflicts would be ubiquitous.
The scholars who have been leading the effort to identify and empower
the single residual owner misunderstand the existing system. They assume
that judges make the reorganization-liquidation decision under current
procedure.93 Judges do not. Managers remain in control of reorganizing
firms. The reorganization-liquidation decision is committed to the
managers’ business judgment and so is virtually beyond judicial review.94

DIP lenders have high priority, are usually fully secured, and bear very little risk.
92. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 12, at 788–96. Whitford and I proposed a system for
ameliorating those conflicts. The system would have required debtors to compensate classes whose
expectancies are disproportionately risked in pursuit of the interests of the firm as a whole. Id.
(proposing risk compensation payments); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Compensating
Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133
(1994) (elaborating on risk compensation proposal). Those “risk compensation payments” would give
unsecured creditors protection analogous to that provided secured creditors by “adequate protection
payments.” Id. at 1146–47 (analogizing risk compensation payments for unsecured creditors to
adequate protection payments for secured creditors).
93. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
94. One court described the test applicable to the prepetition sale of all or part of the firm as
follows:
This Court follows the “sound business purpose” test when examining § 363(b) sales . . . .
The test consists of four elements. A trustee or debtor-in-possession must prove that: (1) a
sound business reason or emergency justifies a pre-confirmation sale; (2) adequate and
reasonable notice of the sale was provided to interested parties; (3) the sale has been proposed
in good faith: and (4) the purchase price is fair and reasonable. The first requirement is a
sound business reason justifying the pre-confirmation sales. This element is similar to many
states “business judgment rule” where great deference is given to a business in determining its
own best interests.
In re W.A. Mallory Co., Inc., 214 B.R. 834, 836 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
If the sale is proposed as part of a plan of reorganization, the judge is supposed to review it. Lynn
M. LoPucki, Can the Market Evaluate Legal Regimes?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 331, 346–47 (2001)
(explaining the feasibility requirement). But many courts simply defer to the decision of the parties,
and those courts that do review do not make the business decision but merely decide whether the plan
proponent’s decision is feasible.
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The managers of reorganizing firms do not have their own money at risk,
but neither do the managers of public companies generally.95
The current form of bankruptcy governance is not perfect, but it is
fundamentally sound. That form recognizes that the prepetition contracts
among investors were not intended to govern the firm in bankruptcy, but
merely to deliver the firm to the bankruptcy court. The court will
safeguard the firm during the brief time necessary for the investors to
recontract. In the interim, the bankruptcy system provides the only form of
governance practical in the circumstances: a benevolent dictatorship of the
board as fiduciary and the bankruptcy judge as referee. The involvement
of judges in bankruptcy governance is not the problem, but the solution.
The empirical evidence suggests that the reorganization process works
best in districts where the bankruptcy judges are active participants, and
fails dismally in those that allow the market actors free rein.96

95. The decision to reorganize or liquidate—which judges rarely make or review—should be
distinguished from the decision whether a particular plan of reorganization or liquidation will work—a
decision the board makes and that judges are required to review. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2000).
96. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231
(2001) (showing failure rates for Delaware- and New York-reorganized firms that are five to seven
times the corresponding rates for other courts); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are
Delaware and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002)
(showing failure rates for Delaware-reorganized firms that are more than ten times the corresponding
rates for courts other than Delaware and New York).
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Appendix A. Investor Priority Levels in Reorganizing Firms
(1)
Firm name

(4)
(3)
(2)
Senior
Number of
Unsecured
investor
unsecured
priority
levels

(5)
Seniorsubordinated

(6)
Junior
subordinated

LTV Corporation

13

3

5

3

Days Inn of America

8

1

1

1

Lomas Financial (1989)

8

1

1

2

National Gypsum Corp.

7

1

2

1

1

Charter Medical

7

1

1

2

Tracor

7

1

2

3

(7)
(8)
Preferred Common
stock
stock

1
4

1
1

3

1
2

2

1
1

Cherokee, Inc.

6

1

1

1

1

Envirodyne Industries

6

1

2

1

1

1

1

Kash N Karry

6

1

1

1

2

1

Memorex (1992)

6

1

1

1

1

1

1

Interco, Inc.

6

1

1

2

1

1

1

Fairfield Communities

6

2

2

1

Hills Department Stores

6

1

2

1

1

1

JPS Textile Group

6

1

1

1

2

1

New Valley Corp.

6

1

1

1

2

1

Orion Pictures

6

1

2

1

1

1

Continental Airlines (1990)

6

4

1

1

Doskocil Companies

6

3

2

1

Intermark, Inc.

6

2

2

Federated Department Stores

5

1

1

1

1
1

1
1

Great American Communications

5

1

1

1

1

1

Memorex (1994)

5

1

1

1

1

1

TWA (1993)

5

1

1

1

1

1

Anacomp

5

1

1

1

1

1

Best Products

5

1

1

1

1

1

National Convenience Stores

5

1

1

1

1

1

NVR

5

1

1

1

1

1

Restaurant Enterprises

5

1

1

1

1

1

Southland Corporation

5

1

1

1

1

1

SPI Holding

5

1

1

1

1

1

UDC Homes

5

1

1

1

1

1

Jamesway Corporation

4

1

1

1
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(1)
Firm name

(4)
(3)
(2)
Senior
Number of
Unsecured
investor
unsecured
priority
levels

(5)
Seniorsubordinated

(6)
Junior
subordinated

(8)
(7)
Preferred Common
stock
stock

O’Brien Environmental Energy

4

1

1

1

1

US Home Corp.

4

1

1

1

Zale Corp.

4

1

1

Rexene Corporation

4

1

1

1

Calton, Inc.

4

1

1

1

1

Forum Group

4

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1

General Development Corp.

4

1

1

1

1

Insilco

4

1

1

1

1

Revco

4

1

1

1

1

Spreckels Industries

4

1

1

1

1

USG Corporation

4

1

1

1

1

AM International

4

1

1

1

1

Americold

4

1

1

1

1

Ames Department Stores

4

1

1

1

1

Edisto Resources

4

1

1

1

1

1

1

First City Bancorporation of Texas

4

1

1

Resorts International

4

2

1

West Point Acquisitions

4

1

1

Bibb Company

3

1

1

1

Circle K Corporation

3

1

1

1

1
1

1

Continental Information Systems

3

1

1

1

Gaylord Container

3

1

1

1

Gilbert/Robinson

3

1

1

1

Grand Union Company

3

1

1

1

Hadson

3

1

1

1

Harvard Industries

3

1

1

1

Hexcel

3

1

1

1

Hillsborough Holdings

3

1

1

1

Ithaca Industries

3

1

1

1

JWP, Inc.

3

1

1

1

Mayflower Group

3

1

1

1

Petrolane Gas

3

1

1

1

Salant Corporation

3

1

1

1
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(1)
Firm name

(4)
(3)
(2)
Senior
Number of
Unsecured
investor
unsecured
priority
levels

(5)
Seniorsubordinated

(6)
Junior
subordinated

(8)
(7)
Preferred Common
stock
stock

Wang Laboratories

3

1

1

1

WTD Industries

3

1

1

1

Greyhound Lines, Inc.

3

1

1

1

America West

3

1

1

1

El Paso Electric

3

1

1

1

Lone Star Industries

3

1

1

1

Standard Brands Paint

3

1

1

1

Sudbury

3

1

1

1

Westmoreland Coal

3

1

1

Eagle Pitcher

3

2

1

Lomas Financial (1995)

3

2

1

NACO Finance

3

1

1

Alexander’s Inc.

2

1

1

1

1

Carter Hawley Hale

2

1

1

Emerson Radio

2

1

1

International American Homes

2

1

1

Kinder Care Learning Centers

2

1

1

Rose’s Stores

2

1

1

TGX Corporation
Average / Total
Total as a percentage of all cases

2
4.3

1

1

18

84

66

33

33

84

21%

100%

79%

39%

39%

100%
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Appendix B. Single Residual Owner Firms
(1)
Firm name

(5)
(3)
(4)
(2)
Junior
Unsecured
Senior
Senior
subordinated subordinated
unsecured
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
90 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents 100 cents
100 cents

(6)
Preferred
stock

(7)
Common stock

Alexander’s, Inc.
unimpaired
Americold
unimpaired
unimpaired
Edisto Resources
unimpaired
$13 million
Hexcel
unimpaired
Hillsborough Holdings
dilution
Kinder Care Learning
14% of the common
O’Brien Environmental
51% of the common
Energy
TGX Corporation
100 cents
unimpaired
Westmoreland Coal
100 cents
unimpaired
unimpaired
New Valley Corp.
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
nominal
as ordered
Calton, Inc.
100 cents
100 cents
89 cents
$4 million
AM International
100 cents 16-68 cents
nominal
nominal
Bibb Company
100 cents
$4 million
46 cents
Grand Union Co (1995)
100 cents
$1 million
63 cents
Harvard Industries
100 cents
$4 million
60 cents
Interco, Inc.
100 cents
5 cents+
0
0
14+ cents
Kash N Karry
100 cents 100 cents
0
0
48 cents
Mayflower Group
100 cents
$6 million
69 cents
Petrolane Gas
100 cents
nominal
35+ cents
Revco
100 cents
4 cents
0
68 cents
Rexene Corporation
100 cents 100 cents
8% of the common
67 cents
America West
nominal+
0
complex
Ames Department Stores
2 cents
0
0
13-77 cents
Best Products (1991)
0
0
0
0
47 cents
Carter Hawley Hale
nominal
46 cents
Circle K Corporation
0
0
unknown
Emerson Radio
0
18+ cents
Greyhound Lines, Inc.
0
0
37 cents
JWP, Inc.
nominal
nominal
34-58 cents
Sudbury
$2 million
nominal
85 cents
+ Indicates that class received additional property for which a value could not be assigned, usually warrants
Separation of numbers by hyphen indicates a range of possible recoveries
Separation by forward slash indicates different recoveries for classes at same priority level.
Shading indicates residual owners classes.
“Cents” are cents per dollar of claim paid to creditors in class.

(8)
Residual
owner
Common
Common
Common
Common
Common
Common
Common
Common
Common
Preferred
Junior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Senior sub
Unsecureds
Unsecureds
Unsecureds
Unsecureds
Unsecureds
Unsecureds
Unsecureds
Unsecureds
Unsecureds

Appendix C. Multiple Residual Owner Firms
(1)
Firm name

Days Inn of America
TWA (1993)
Zale Corp.
Eagle Pitcher
El Paso Electric
General Development
Insilco
Wang Laboratories
Anacomp
Cherokee, Inc.

(2)
Senior
unsecured

(3)
Unsecured

(4)
Senior
subordinate

(5)
Junior
subordinate

50 cents
32 cents
25 cents

23 cents
20 cents
18 cents
27 cents
65/80 cents

9 cents
3 cents

6 cents

23 cents
35/50 cents
63+ cents
100 cents
100 cents

10 cents
19 cents
63+/2 cents
87 cents
63 cents

100 cents

Gilbert/Robinson
Great American
Communications
Hadson
JPS Textile Group
Memorex (1992)
Memorex (1994)

0
7 cents
12% of the
common +
2 cents
10 cents
16 cents
41 cents

100 cents

100 cents

100 cents

100 cents

84 cents

75 cents

91+ cents
16 cents

100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents

69 cents
58 cents
37 cents
63 cents

13 cents
18 cents
13 cents

Washington University Open Scholarship

(6)
Preferred
stock

nominal
$1 million

nominal
$5 million+

(7)
(8)
Common stock Number of
residual
owners
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
21
3% of the
2
common +
0
2
$2 million
2
unknown
2*
nominal
2
8% of the
2
common
6% of the
2
common
2% of the
2
common
$111 million
2
0
2
nominal
2
nominal
2
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(1)
Firm name

Orion Pictures
Resorts International
UDC Homes
US Home Corp.
USG Corporation
West Point Acquisition
WTD Industries
Restaurant Enterprises
Spreckels Industries

(2)
Senior
unsecured

100 cents

Lone Star Industries
Bucyrus-Erie Company
Lomas Financial (1995)
Federated Dept. Stores
Jamesway Corp. (1993)
Intermark, Inc.
National Convenience
Stores
National Gypsum Corp.
NVR, Inc.
Salant Corporation

(3)
Unsecured

(4)
Senior
subordinate

(5)
Junior
subordinate

(6)
Preferred
stock

100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents
100 cents

32/81 cents
70 cents
83 cents
85 cents
51 cents
32 cents
100 cents
94 cents
100 cents

10 cents

nominal

21 cents

0

89 cents
61 cents

65 cents
67 cents

86 cents

15 cents
27 cents
36 cents
37-42 cents

35 cents
100/45 cents
62 cents
58 cents
100 cents

Hills Department Stores
Southland Corporation

105 cents
100 cents
83 cents
100 cents

26-31
cents2

$28 million

84-90% of
“face value”

by entity
10-15/66 cents
46 cents
53 cents
79 cents
75 cents

Charter Medical

Amdura

$20 million

100 cents

Standard Brands Paint

Lomas Financial (1989)
Envirodyne Industries
Fairfield Communities
Tracor
Continental Airlines
Continental Information
Systems
Doskocil Companies
LTV Corporation

12 cents

7 cents

11 cents

nominal
nominal

86 cents
59 cents
87/62 cents

27 cents
20 cents

$2 million

70 cents

38 cents

25% of the
common
$7 million

78 cents
30 cents
66/71/61 cents 54/27 cents

53 cents
65 cents
42 cents
100 cents
unknown
59 cents

36/21 cents
50 cents
42 cents
37/9 cents
0
12 cents

37 cents
13-57 cents2

18 cents
8-11 cents2

by entity

stock
5% of the
common
nominal

18 cents
42 cents
1 cents

$500,000
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(7)
(8)
Common stock Number of
residual
owners
nominal
2
$18 million
2*
0
2
$41 million
2
nominal
2
nominal
2
$3 million
2
$234,000
2
25% of the
2
common
35% of the
2
common
2*
0
2*
0
3
nominal
3
nominal
3*
nominal
3
0
$9 million
22-44% of the
common
25% of the
common
3% of the
common
nominal
7% of the
common
nominal
0
0
diluted
0
0
$3 million
$4 million

3*
3
3
3
3
3*
3
3
4*
4*
4*
4*
5*
5*
9*
Several*

* Figure includes one or more residual owners resulting from additional entities in corporate group
+ Indicates that class received additional property for which a value could not be assigned, usually warrants
Separation of numbers by hyphen indicates a range of possible recoveries
Separation by forward slash indicates different recoveries for classes at same priority level.
Shading indicates residual owners classes.
“Cents” are cents per dollar of claim paid to creditors in class.
1 Eagle Pitcher commercial creditors and asbestos personal injury claimants were considered separate priority levels because of the
conflict of interest between present and future creditors
2 LTV ranges of recovery are for multiple classes. Low number stated is for lowest end of any range; highest number stated is for
highest end of any range.
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